Petitioner was employed as an operating room nurse when she injured her shoulder while transferring a 350-pound patient. She reached maximum medical improvement two years after the accepted work injury and was placed on a permanent 25-pound lifting restriction. The respondent did not offer her work within her restrictions and terminated her. Vocational rehabilitation services were commenced by the respondent. Petitioner accepted a job as a respiratory nurse earning substantially less per hour. Respondent's vocational expert opined that the petitioner did not fully cooperate in the job search and accepted a position paying less than average for a registered nurse. The arbitrator denied the wage differential claim, but the Commission reversed and awarded a wage differential based upon the difference between $19 per hour at a nursing home and the current wage rate of an OR nurse, $43 per hour. The appellate court affirmed the Commission's wage differential award, finding that the petitioner was precluded from her “usual and customary line of employment” as an OR nurse despite the fact that she continued to work as a registered nurse.

The petitioner worked as a flooring installer for S & H Flooring and filed a repetitive trauma claim for an injury to his right knee. The testimony showed that the petitioner last worked for the employer on August 2, 2002. After that day of work, he drove to Wichita, Kansas to install a floor at a relative’s home. Upon arriving in Wichita, he testified he was barely able to walk because of pain in his right knee. The petitioner told Craig Jones, a foreman for co-respondent Cushing Commercial Carpets, that he injured his knee while working on a job for a relative. The project manager for S & H Flooring testified that he spoke with the petitioner before he left on August 12 and no injury was mentioned. The petitioner appeared normal and did not limp. The project manager subsequently spoke with the petitioner’s wife who told him that the petitioner injured himself while installing a floor at a relative’s home. The arbitrator denied benefits but the Industrial Commission reversed.

S & H Flooring filed an appeal claiming that the petitioner failed to give proper notice and failed to prove that he sustained an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment with S & H Flooring. As to notice, the court stated that the employer was put on notice that the petitioner injured himself at work and could have inferred that it was a work-related injury. With respect to whether the petitioner proved that he had sustained accidental injuries that arose out of the course of his employment, the appellate court relied on the manifest weight standard finding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision and findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses. The court concluded by stating that although not appropriate in this case it would consider giving "an extra degree of scrutiny" to the Commission’s decision where the Commission makes credibility determinations regardless of the arbitrator’s findings.

371 Ill.App.3d 882, 864 N.E.2d 266, 309 Ill.Dec. 400, Ill.App. 5 Dist., February 21, 2007 (NO. 5-06-0081WC)

Petitioner worked as a patient care assistant for the respondent. She injured her low back at work when she slipped and caught herself on a patient monitor. Following the work injury, petitioner went on to have a two-level fusion in her low back. The employer stipulated to accident but disputed causal connection based on the preexisting condition and the fact that petitioner did not complain of any radicular pain for two months after the work injury. Petitioner admitted to low back pain that preexisted the work injury, and in fact, missed two weeks of work due to low back pain two months before the work injury. The arbitrator and Commission found the case compensable, relying on one of the petitioner's treating physicians and rejecting two physicians supporting the respondent's position. The appellate court affirmed the Commission's decision under the manifest weight standard, noting that it would not overturn the Commission's on issues of credibility where there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission's decision.

Petitioner, a longshoreman, fell in a land-based warehouse injuring his knee, shoulders, left hand and back in March of 1999. He underwent knee surgery in July 1999 and was released to work. He continued to complain of hand and back pain and eventually underwent a cervical fusion and lumbar laminectomy. The treating surgeons related the back surgery to his work injury and released him to work as a warehouse checker with restrictions of no climbing or transporting injured workers. He was essentially restricted to administrative duties. The respondent’s vocational expert testified that the petitioner could not return to work for respondent due to the restrictions but that there was a stable labor market with positions that fit his restrictions. The petitioner’s vocational expert testified that there was no stable labor market for the petitioner and that he could not perform the jobs outlined by respondent’s vocational expert. The arbitrator and Industrial Commission found that the petitioner was permanently and totally disabled. The respondent appealed arguing that the permanent total award was not supported by the evidence and that the claim was preempted by the Federal Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Act. The appellate court held that the federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over land-based injuries that fall within the coverage of the Federal act. Thus, respondent’s motion to dismiss was properly denied. It also affirmed the Commission’s finding of permanent and total disability deferring to the Commission’s reliance on the petitioner’s vocational expert and rejecting the respondent’s vocational expert.

The Commission awarded benefits and included overtime in the calculation of the petitioner’s average weekly wage. The respondent appealed contending that the average weekly wage should not have included overtime. The appellate court reversed the Industrial Commission finding that it was undisputed that the petitioner’s regular work week consisted of five eight hour shifts. The uncontradicted evidence also established that the petitioner was not required to work overtime as a condition of his employment, but rather he used his seniority and requested to work overtime. Therefore, it was properly excluded from the calculation of his average weekly wage.

The petitioner suffered an injury to his left knee in a work related accident and was awarded a wage differential of $143.92 per week by the Arbitrator. The wage differential was based on the fact that the petitioner’s treating physician placed the petitioner on a permanent restriction that precluded him from driving a truck. The petitioner remained employed with the respondent as a dispatcher earning less than he did as a truck driver. The petitioner’s previous job was assigned to co-employee Wes Trosper.

The petitioner sought review with the Industrial Commission and the Commission issued a corrected decision reducing the wage differential award to $121.49 per week, which equaled two-thirds of the difference between his current earnings and his average weekly wage. The petitioner then sought review in the appellate court claiming that the Commission improperly refused to use the wages of Wes Trosper in calculating the wage differential award. The appellate court found that the Commission’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was not clear that the petitioner would have made the same wage Wes Trosper made in the same position because Trosper had more seniority and was more likely to successfully bid on lucrative routes than the petitioner would have been. The Court noted that it was proper for the Commission to calculate the petitioner’s wage loss based on is pre-injury earnings when other methods of determining post earnings were too speculative.

The petitioner worked for P.I.& I. as an employee truck driver from March to May, 2000. He then bought his own truck and on May 15, 2000 signed an independent contractor agreement. Roberson was responsible for all costs and expenses associated with operating his truck, including fuel, tolls, license plates and taxes. The contract permitted Roberson to have employees and he was required to have workers’ compensation insurance for himself and any employees. He was also required to carry liability insurance coverage. The contract specifically provided that it was not intended to create an employee/employer relationship and that P.I. & I. shall have no direction or control over Roberson except in the results to be obtained. The Arbitrator found that Roberson was not an employee of P.I. & I. The Commission reversed and found that P.I. & I. both had and exercised a right to control Roberson’s work activities. The appellate court reversed the Commission and found that the petitioner was not an employee. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the Commission’s decision. It found that no single factor is determinative of the employment relationship and the significance of the factors will change depending on the work involved. It ruled that the Commission’s decision was not against the manifest weight of evidence. It noted that Roberson’s work fell entirely in the scope of P.I. & I.’s business and that P.I. & I. used independent contractor drivers almost exclusively. Finally, the Court noted that there was a growing tendency nationally to classify owner-drivers of trucks as employees when they perform a continuous service that is an integral part of the employers business.

The petitioner worked as a painter for the Westin Hotel and injured his back and left leg when trying to prevent a cart from tipping over. The arbitrator and the Industrial Commission found the petitioner to be an odd-lot permanent total and the petitioner sought review in the appellate court. In reversing the Commission’s opinion finding that the petitioner was an odd-lot permanent total, the appellate court noted that the petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he fit into the odd-lot category--one who though not altogether incapacitated to work, is so handicapped that he will not be employed regularly in any well known branch of the labor market. The petitioner relied on Dr. Coe, an occupational medicine specialist, to support his contention that he was an odd-lot permanent total. The courted noted that the most recent cases making an odd-lot determination rely on evidence from rehabilitation service providers or vocational counselors. The court noted that two other physicians who reviewed the case did not feel that the petitioner was permanently and totally disabled. The appellate court ruled that the Commission’s reliance on Dr. Coe’s opinion to support its odd-lot permanent total finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence since Dr. Coe is not a vocational expert and did not order a vocational evaluation of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner failed to perform any sort of job search.

Petitioner was injured in a motor vehicle accident while in the course of his employment with Herr Funeral Home. He received workers’ compensation benefits of $162,588.33 from Pekin Insurance. He then received an uninsured motorist award in the amount of $250,000. The uninsured motorist coverage was provided under Herr’s automobile insurance by Pekin Insurance. It issued a check in the amount of $87,412 to plaintiff in full satisfaction of the arbitration award. Pekin Insurance asserted that it was entitled to a set-off in the full amount of the workers’ compensation lien of $162,588.33. The trial court agreed and the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court held that Pekin Insurance was entitled to a set-off for the workers’ compensation lien, however, the plaintiff was entitled to an additional $40,467, reflecting 25% paid to plaintiff’s attorney in the workers’ compensation case.

The petitioner sustained a work related accident while employed by Consolidated. The Arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits, medical benefits but denied petitioner’s request for vocational rehabilitation benefits. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed the TTD and medical award but also orderd that Consolidated be required to provide the petitioner with "meaningful vocational rehabilitation." Consolidated appealed claiming that the Commission’s order for vocational rehabilitation was inappropriate because there was no evidence in the record that said services would increase the petitioner’s earning capacity.

The appellate court held that the Commission‘s decision containing generalized orders for vocational rehabilitation without a specific plan is interlocutory in nature and not appealable. It further held that the Commission’s decision ordering the employer to provide "meaningful vocational rehabilitation" without specifying the services of the offer is both confusing and inappropriate. Therefore, it remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings.

Petitioner, an iron worker, injured both knees in a work-related fall. The arbitrator awarded 25% of each leg. The Commission reversed and found the petitioner to be an odd-lot permanent total. The appellate court upheld the Commission’s decision despite the fact that the petitioner did not present any evidence of a job search. It held that an odd-lot permanent total may be proven either by an unsuccessful job search or by evidence that the petitioner cannot be regularly employed in a well-known branch of the labor market based on age, skills, training, experience and education. The appellate court acknowledged that there was a dispute between the vocational experts in the case but sustained the Commission’s decision that gave more weight to the employee’s vocational expert.

The respondent filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Unilever filed a bond executed by Sandy S. Echeveste, one of its attorneys. In addition to the bond, Unilever filed a "Statement of Authority in Support of Bond" which stated that Mark F. Slavin was authorized to sign the bond’s principal in lieu of one of Unilever’s corporate officers. The Statement of Authority was signed by Unilever’s resource manager, Barry A. Patterson. Petitioner moved to quash the summons issued by the circuit court and dismiss the appeal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Unilever filed a response that included affidavits of Barry Patterson and Mark Slavin. The affidavits stated that Unilever extended authorization to Mark F. Slavin and his law firm including associate attorney, Sandy Echeveste, who signed the bond. In dismissing the appeal, the appellate court noted the well-established authority that the trial court may not consider evidence filed after the expiration of the 20 day statutory review period in order to establish an attorney’s authority to sign an appeal bond. Since the affidavit filed by Unilever authorized only Mark F. Slavin to sign the bond, any subsequent affidavits clarifying authority to sign the bond could not be considered. Therefore the appeal was dismissed.

The petitioner alleged repetitive trauma injuries to his right and left shoulders and back. He alleged date of accident of July 17, 2000, the last date that he worked for the respondent. The arbitrator found the case compensable but the Industrial Commission reversed unanimously and held that the petitioner failed to give the respondent timely notice of his accidental injuries. The appellate court affirmed the Industrial Commission, finding that the petitioner failed to give notice of his alleged work injury within 45 days of the accident date. It noted that the accident date is the date on which the injury "manifests itself" meaning that the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the petitioner’s employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person. The court noted that although the employer knew the petitioner was injured within 45 days of the alleged accident, the record did not show notice of "industrial injuries."

It further held that respondent was not required to show undue prejudice because the prejudice requirement is not required unless some notice is given. The fact that the respondent knew of the injury but not of the industrial injury did not constitute defective notice under the Act. Finally, the court held that the 45 day notice period runs from the date of the injury alleged by the petitioner.