369 Ill.App.3d 591, 861 N.E.2d 202, 308 Ill.Dec. 137, Ill.App. 1 Dist., December 19, 2006 (NO. 1-06-0717WC)

Petitioner was working on a scaffold when he tripped over a brick and then onto a safety gate which snapped off causing him to fall 12 feet to the ground. Respondent's witnesses testified that the petitioner was told earlier that morning to fasten the safety gate with a pin. The safety gate was not pinned when petitioner fell. The arbitrator denied benefits because the petitioner committed an act in violation of a the respondent's safety rules which took him outside the scope of his employment. The Commission reversed the arbitrator, essentially ignoring the safety rule defense. The appellate court held that the safety rule violation did not put the petitioner outside the sphere of his employment because he was performing his work duties, albeit negligently. Thus, a violation of a safety rule is only a defense if the petitioner is performing activities not required by his employment.

Petitioner recovered $984,750 in a third-party case arising out of the same injury as his unresolved workers' compensation claim. The parties stipulated that the work injury caused 100% loss of use of his right leg. The petitioner contended that the employer was not entitled to a credit for the third-party settlement as it pertained to medical bills relating to maintenance, repair and replacement of his prosthesis. The arbitrator and Commission ruled that the employer was entitled to a credit against any obligation for all medical bills outstanding or in the future. The circuit court reversed the Commission and found that the prosthetic expenses invoked a statutory exception to the general rule of employer reimbursement from proceeds of a third-party suit. The appellate court reversed the circuit court, rejecting the petitioner's reliance on the language in section 8(a) stating that appliances should not be considered as compensation. It held that compensation under section 5(b), the employer’s lien, includes payments relating to prosthetic devices. Thus, the Commission's decision was reinstated.

Petitioner testified that he sustained a contusion injury to his low back on September 21st after being struck by a riser while loading a fuel truck. He did not report it to his employer until October 8th  and did not report it to his physicians until October 16th. The employer presented testimony that the accident could not have occurred as claimed based on the engineering of the riser. The arbitrator denied benefits and specifically found the petitioner not credible. The Commission, with Commissioner Ruth acting as a temporary commissioner, reversed  and found the petitioner credible and awarded benefits. The employer challenged the Commission's decision based on the makeup of the panel and causal connection. The appellate court affirmed the Commission's decision. It held that section 13 of the Act did not preclude Commissioner Ruth from acting as a temporary commissioner. Further, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission's decision on credibility and causation.

OVERRULLED BY ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT IN 2007
In October 1997, petitioner had pain and numbness in her hands that she believed was related to her repetitive work activities. She first sought medical treatment for this condition in August 2000 and was diagnosed with work related carpal tunnel syndrome in late 2000. She filed an application for adjustment of claim in January 2001. The Commission found that the petitioner's carpal tunnel syndrome manifested itself in October 1997 and ruled the claim time barred. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the petitioner's statement that she believed her condition was work related in 1997 amounted to an expert opinion and that she would have had a difficult time proving her case in 1997 without having sought any medical treatment. The court held that the date of manifestation was the date the petitioner first sought medical treatment in August 2000. Despite the reversal, the court restated the longstanding rule that the date of manifestation in a repetitive trauma claim is: “the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship to the petitioner's employment would have become apparent to a reasonable person.” The court further stated that the most common dates of manifestation are the first date when the petitioner requires medical treatment or the date on which the petitioner can no longer perform work activities.

Petitioner testified that he injured his knee as he descended a ladder at work while carrying a heavy load. His treating physician testified that he had chronic knee problems prior to the alleged injury. Moreover, on his first visit to the doctor following the alleged injury, the petitioner told the doctor that he injured his knee a long time ago and woke up that morning with terrible pain. The treating doctor noted that he had chronic knee pain for three years with occasional flare ups. He denied any specific injury, but mentioned to the doctor that he had pain while climbing ladders. The petitioner weighed 380 pounds. Petitioner went on to have knee surgery and was unable to go back to work as a sheet metal worker. The arbitrator and Commission found the case compensable and the appellate court affirmed, citing the manifest standard. It held that the Commission's reliance on the petitioner's testimony was not unreasonable. In a separate ruling, the appellate court overruled the employer’s Ghere objection to an opinion from a treating physician who unexpectedly testified at deposition that the petitioner could not go back to his former line of employment. Although the opinion was not expressed in his reports or records, the appellate court allowed the opinion to stand.  It reasoned that the physician’s testimony was a natural continuation of the language in his report stating that the petitioner's condition would restrict his ability to perform his work as a sheet metal worker.

At the time petitioner was hired in Illinois, he executed a contract by which he agreed to be bound by the Workers’ Compensation Act of Ohio and waived all provisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. The claimant was injured in Pennsylvania while driving a truck. He filed claims in both Ohio and Illinois and received an award in Ohio. The employer sought dismissal of the Illinois claim, arguing (1) the employment contract waived jurisdiction in Illinois and (2) the recovery in Ohio precluded recovery in Illinois. The Illinois Appellate Court ruled that section 23 of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act prohibits the employer and the employee from entering into any kind of agreement depriving Illinois of jurisdiction. Thus, the employment contract was held invalid to the extent that it was asserted as a waiver of jurisdiction in Illinois. The court further held that the receipt of benefits in one state does not bar a subsequent award in another state with concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, it held that the employer’s argument, that the Ohio award acted as res judicata, failed based on a lack of proof.

Petitioner received an award on September 17, 2002, and neither party appealed. Respondent’s attorney wrote to petitioner’s attorney on October 25, 2002, requesting the petitioner’s Social Security number and inquiring as to whether the petitioner was interested in a lump sum settlement. On November 19, 2002, the petitioner’s attorney confirmed in writing that the petitioner was not interested in a lump sum settlement and wanted the award paid within one week. Next, on December 13, 2002, the petitioner filed an Application for Entry of Judgment pursuant to section 19(g). On January 2, 2003, the respondent paid the award in full. Then, on April 3, 2003, the petitioner sought attorney’s fees of $32,310.35, representing 20 percent of the amount awarded in circuit court under section 19(g). The circuit court awarded $6,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $847.20 in interest. The petitioner appealed, contending entitlement to 20 percent of the gross award under section 19(g); the respondent cross appealed arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that the respondent’s conduct amounted to a refusal to pay under section 19(g). The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s finding that the respondent’s conduct amounted to refusal to pay and also affirmed the circuit court’s award of $6,000.00 in fees and interest. It held that section 19(g) does not require attorney fees of 20 percent, but only that the attorney’s fees not exceed 20 percent of the award. It ruled that it was within the circuit court’s discretion to weigh the conduct of the parties and arrive at a fair assessment of attorney’s fees. The fees in this case, $6,000.00, were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Claimant slipped and fell on a bathroom floor on the employer’s premises injuring his left arm. The petitioner admitted at trial that he did not observe any foreign objects on the floor or any defects in the floor. Moreover, he did not know what caused his fall. An engineering consultant testified for the respondent that the slip resistance of the floor was within national safety standards. The arbitrator and Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission found the case compensable based on the fact that the bathroom floor had not been cleaned recently. The appellate court reversed and reviewed the case on a de novo basis because there were no disputes of fact in the underlying case. Thus, the manifest weight standard did not apply. The appellate court ruled that the claimant failed to show that the fall arose out of and in the course of his employment because claimant failed to present any evidence as to the cause of the fall. It is important to note that the court did not strain to find compensability by following the unexplained fall doctrine, which was not mentioned in the decision.

The petitioner was injured while playing volleyball at a company picnic and sustained a back injury. He was paid his regular salary the entire day, but was not ordered or assigned to attend the picnic. He was diagnosed with a herniation and underwent low back surgery. The arbitrator found the case not compensable and the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed. The appellate court affirmed the Commission ruling that his injuries were not compensable because he was not ordered or assigned to attend the picnic. The court distinguished the Woodrum case by noting that the petitioner did not face the prospect of a loss of pay or vacation/personal days as a consequence of foregoing the picnic. If he had not gone to the picnic he could have worked the entire day just like any other.

The petitioner sustained a knee injury when she slipped and fell on a floor while working for the respondent. She underwent surgery and following her recovery was told by her treating doctor that she was physically unable to perform her former job as a waitress. In May of 2000, she eventually accepted a job as a paralegal paying $34,000.00 per year. Two years prior to that, she had earned $44,000.00 with respondent, as had a co-employee. In 2000, the same co-employee earned $50,000.00 and another coemployee earned $54,000.00. The arbitrator awarded a period of disability and 60 percent loss of the use of the left leg. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded a wage differential commencing on the date that she began working as a paralegal. The respondent appealed, claiming that the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission erred in awarding a wage differential. The respondent did not make any arguments regarding the petitioner’s incapacity to return to her former employment, but simply argued that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof regarding an impairment of earnings. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Commission, and held that the Commission’s reliance on the wages of co-employees to show the current earning capacity at her former occupation reasonable and reliable.

The parties tried this matter in April of 1997, and the petitioner received an award. Neither party appealed. In April 1999, the petitioner filed a 19(h) Petition which was denied by the Commission. In July 2002, the claimant again filed a 19(h) Petition and the employer moved to dismiss it as being filed outside the 30-month period described by the statute. The Commission granted the petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, and the claimant appealed. The claimant argued that the 30-month limitations period began to run after the date of the Commission’s denial of the petitioner’s first section 19(h) Petition, relying on Harden v. Industrial Comm’n, 154 Ill. App. 3d 390 (1987). The appellate court distinguished Harden because in this case the original 19(h) Petition was denied. In Harden, the first 19(h) Petition was allowed and additional benefits were awarded. In Harden, the court allowed a second 19(h) Petition after the 30-month period, but within the 30-month period following the first 19(h) award. The basis for the Harden decision was that it alleviated the inherent problem of speculative awards that must account for anticipated increases and decreases in a claimant’s disability. Since the first 19(h) decision in this case was denied, no additional 19(h) filings would be allowed after the 30-month period from the date of the accident. To do so would preserve the petitioner’s right of review in perpetuity so long as a successive 19(h) Petitions were filed within 30 months of the previous denial.

The petitioner was employed at the University of Illinois as a midwife. In 1999, she suffered a right knee injury with a torn medial meniscus
and underwent arthroscopic surgery. In December 2000, she was attending a mandatory, monthly midwife service meeting. She parked her car on the third floor of the University of Illinois parking structure in an area designated for employees. As she passed through a doorway, between the parking garage and the walkway, she tripped over a metal threshold and twisted her right knee. She attended the meeting and then went to the emergency room where it was recorded that she injured her right knee after slipping on ice. The claimant denied ever giving a history of slipping on ice. She reported the incident to a University police officer while in the emergency room. The police report stated that she gave a history of tripping over a metal floor plate that separated the parking garage from the walkway. The arbitrator denied the case, but the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed and found that the petitioner sustained accidental injuries which arose out of and in the course of her employment. The University appealed, arguing that the decision of the Commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence because at the time of the injury, the claimant was not exposed to` a risk greater than that to which the general public was exposed. The appellate court rejected the University’s argument and held that the case did not merely involve the risks inherent in walking across a threshold as the University asserted. It ruled that when an injury to an employee arriving forwork takes place in an area on the employer’s premises which constitutes a usual access route for employees, and is caused by some special risk or hazard located thereon, the “arising out of” requirement of the Act is
satisfied.

The petitioner suffered an intracerebral hemorrhage and stroke while giving a speech at a dinner. The claimant testified that she was nervous about her speech because it was being given on such short notice and she wanted everything to be“just right.” As she stood up to give her speech, her head hurt and she heard a roaring sound in her ears. About halfway through the speech, she lost sight in one of her eyes and then lost consciousness. The claimant’s family physician personally witnessed the incident and testified that the stress of the petitioner’s job duties and the stress of giving the speech caused the claimant’s hemorrhage. The respondent presented testimony from two physicians, one an internist and one a neurologist, both of whom opined that the hemorrhage was not caused by the stress of any unusual work activities. The arbitrator rejected the findings of the petitioner’s treating physician and adopted the findings of the respondent’s medical experts. The Commission reversed and ordered medical expenses exceeding $277,000.00 and awarded permanent and total disability. The employer argued first, that the speech at the dinner was a voluntary recreational activity that was specifically excluded from the Act under section 11. The appellate court rejected that argument because there was evidence in the record to support a finding that the claimant was “ordered or assigned” not only to attend the event, but to speak. Next, the employer argued that the treating physician lacked the expertise of both of respondent’s experts. The appellate court ruled that the Commission was forced to weigh the competing expert testimony and the fact that it adopted the treating family physician over the respondent’s more specialized experts did not warrant a reversal under the manifest weight standard. The Commission was presented with conflicting expert testimony, its assessment of the weight and credibility of that evidence would not be disturbed under the manifest weight standard.

In December 2000, a 19(b) was awarded in favor of the petitioner in the amount of $85,000.00 in TTD benefits. Respondent filed a Petition for Review, and in August of 2000 the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision. The respondent appealed to the circuit court and appellate court which affirmed the Commission’s decision. In February of 2004, the appellate court denied the employer’s Petitions for Rehearing and Certification. In March 2004, the employer filed a motion with the Commission seeking to adjudicate payment of the award and medical bills. It contended that $29,000.00 in TTD benefits awarded had already been paid along with interest. He also argued that at the time of the original hearing, all the medical bills were unpaid but since the hearing, the defendant’s group carrier, HMO of Illinois, satisfied four of the outstanding bills. It further alleged that it paid 100 percent of the petitioner’s group insurance premiums. In May 2004, the petitioner filed a 19(g) motion in circuit court seeking to reduce his award to a judgment. The court allowed the motion and awarded $41,375.00 in attorney’s fees. The circuit court further found that the employer was not entitled to a credit, and theCommission was without jurisdiction to determine whether respondent was entitled to a credit. In the appellate court, the employer argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was remanded to the Commission. The appellate court rejected that argument, as the cause was remanded for only a permanency determination. The TTD award was final. The court further noted that only tender of full payment of the final award is a defense to a 19(g) Petition. The employer conceded that it only made partial payment due to the credit issue. The court further noted that the Commission’s decision became final in February 2004, and nearly three months passed before the 19(g) hearing in which the employer could have satisfied its obligation. The appellate court rejected the employer’s argument that
it made a good faith offer of settlement, and agreed to hold the petitioner harmless regarding any claims brought by his medical providers. It held that the argument ignored the Commission’s directive to pay $85,000.00 in medical expenses. Although a partial payment had been made at the time of the 19(g) award, the appellate court held that only a tender of full payment of the final award is a defense to a 19(g) Petition. The fact that the employer had made a substantial payment on the award did not negate the court’s authority to enter a fee award based on the entire award from the Commission. At the time of the hearing only $88,756.00 was due, but despite that the court’s award of $41,375.00 in fees was affirmed.

The Commission made a wage differential award to claimant in 1993. The employer sought to terminate the wage differential award in 2002 when it discovered that claimant’s wage matched the wage he had been earning in 1988 at the time of the work injury. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the employer’s motion to suspend benefits based on lack of jurisdiction. The employer argued that the Commission had jurisdiction to modify the award based on sections 19(h), 8(d)(1) and 8(f). The Supreme Court ruled that a motion to modify a wage differential award could only be brought under section 19(h). It found that section 8(d)(1) had no provision for modifying an award and section 8(f) was limited to awards of permanent and total disability. Since the employer’s motion was brought well after the 30 month limitation in section 19(h), the Commission was without jurisdiction to review or modify the award.

Claimant was hired by United Airlines on January 6, 1969, to work as a ramp serviceman at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois. He worked for United continuously in Illinois until 1993, when he voluntarily applied for transfer to United's facility at Orlando International Airport in Orlando, Florida. There was no interruption between Mahoney's last day of work in Chicago and the beginning of his work the next day in Orlando. He worked continuously in ramp service for United at Orlando until the time of the hearing. Claimant resides in Orlando, where he purchased a home in 1994. He remarried in Florida, has a Florida driver's license, pays taxes in Florida, and pays no taxes in Illinois. Although he has the right, he has never sought to relocate back to Illinois or to any other state.

The arbitrator and Commission found no jurisdiction in Illinois after considering several factors including: 1) the location of the initial contract of hire; 2) the continuity of employment between the time of contract and the time of injury; (3) whether the transfer was voluntary; (4) the length of time between the departure from Illinois and the injury; and (5) the significance of claimant's contacts with Illinois following his departure.

The appellate and Supreme Court reversed the Commission, ruling that the place of the contract of hire is the sole determining factor for the existence of jurisdiction in Illinois over employment injuries occurring outside of Illinois. It found that the plain, unambiguous language of section 1(b)(2) confers jurisdiction to the Commission over all injuries occurring outside the state of Illinois when the contract for hire is made within Illinois.