Claimant obtained an award from the arbitrator and the employer filed a petition for review. The decision of the arbitrator was affirmed and the employer paid the award with interest on the TTD and PPD portions of the award but not on the medical expenses awarded. Claimant filed a petition for penalties for the employer’s failure to pay interest on the medical expenses. The Commission ruled that the claimant was entitled to interest on the medical expenses but denied penalties finding that the employer’s failure to pay was justified. The appellate court affirmed the Commission. It rejected the employer’s argument that section 19(n) of the Act, which governs interest on arbitration awards, does not apply to an award of medical expenses because such expenses are not "compensation" under section 19(n). The court ruled that although McMahan v. Industrial Comm’n, 183 Ill. 2d 499 (1998) did not involve section 19(n) interest, it made a sweeping statement that the payment of medical expenses should be considered "compensation" under the Act. Thus, section 19(n) interest is payable on medical expenses awarded by an arbitrator while a case is pending review to the Commission.

Claimant alleged that she developed a respiratory illness and chemical sensitivity while working for her employer. The arbitrator found that claimant had proven the diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) caused by work exposure and awarded permanent total disability benefits. On review, the Commission reduced the arbitrator’s award to a small peiod of TTD and just over $1,000 in medical expenses. The Commission refused to consider claimant’s expert evidence on MCS. The appellate court affirmed the Commission, finding that the Dr. Vetter’s testimony on MCS did not satisfy the “general acceptance” test first expressed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).

The court noted that, generally, if the proposed testimony concerns a syndrome that has not yet been admitted in Illinois, then the trial court should conduct a Frye hearing to determine the scientific validity, or invalidity, of the syndrome. However, during a worker's compensation arbitration hearing, most expert testimony is received via evidence depositions. In most cases, it would be impractical and inconsistent with the general nature of worker's compensation proceedings to require a separate Frye hearing with live witnesses. Since the arbitrator and the Commission considered all of the evidence relevant to the Frye issue before ruling on the admissibility of Dr. Vetter's testimony and dealt with the issues they would have addressed had a separate Frye hearing been held, the court found that the procedure employed was appropriate.

Justice Thomas recused himself leaving an even number of justices to decide the issue. Since the remaining justices remained split and were unable to reach a required majority of four, the appeal was dismissed.

Claimant was a school teacher in Chicago that was accused by a parent of mistreating a student while breaking up a fight at school. He was arrested by Chicago police officers and taken into custody. Claimant testified that he was physically abused by the police officers and was eventually treated for psychological problems related to his arrest. The arbitrator denied benefits concluding that the action of the police that caused the claimant’s injury was so remote from the work activity that it did not arise out of his employment. The Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator. The appellate court reversed, finding that the risk of being arrested for breaking up a fight was incidental to his employment. Absent facts supporting the proposition that the claimant stepped outside the scope of employment as a teacher when he broke up the fight, the case was compensable. The court noted a claimant’s injury is compensable under the Act if it arises out of and in the course of the employment. The phrase "in the course of" relates to the time place and circumstance of the injury. A claimant's injury is received in the course of his employment when it occurs while he is working, at a place where he may reasonably be while performing his duties and, while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incidental thereto. "Arising out of one's employment" refers to the origin or cause of the claimant's injury. An injury arises out of the employment when its origin is found in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment. "A risk is incidental to the employment where it belongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do in fulfilling his duties." Since breaking up the fight was incidental to his employment and the risk of being arrested for such actions was a risk of employment, the claim arose out of his employment.

Claimant was an over-the-road truck driver who had a fatal cardiac event while on a California interstate. Both claimant and the employer relied on highly credentialed cardiologists who disagreed as to the cause of the cause of claimant’s death. The arbitrator awarded benefits but the Commission reversed. It found no causal relationship and further that there was no indication that, because of his employment, decedent was under stress greater than that to which the general public is ordinarily exposed. The Commission determined "[i]f there was stress associated with decedent's driving, *** it was legally insufficient to warrant compensation." It further stated decedent's condition was so far advanced that any physical exertion on his part would have been an overexertion. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Commission’s decision was not at odds with Sisbro v. Industrial Comm’n, 207 Ill.2d 193 (2003). It explained the Sisbro rejected the argument that "where a causal connection between work and injury has been established, it can be negated simply because the injury might also have occurred as a result of some 'normal daily activity.’" Instead, whether an injured employee's health has deteriorated so that any normal daily activity is an overexertion or whether the work-related activity engaged in presents risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed are factors to be considered when determining whether a sufficient causal connection between employment and an injury has been established. In this case the Commission found no causal connection between the cardiac event and claimant’s work activities and also found decedent's condition was so advanced that any exertion on his part would have been an overexertion leading to a cardiac event. The court ruled that the Commission’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Claimant was awarded a wage differential against United Parcel Service, which was insured by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Claimant then filed a motion under section 24 of the Act requesting that Liberty Mutual deposit a sum of money, as calculated under section 24, to insure compliance with the decision. The Commission denied claimant’s motion finding that claimant failed to show that Liberty Mutual had any financial difficulties to warrant a remedy under section 24. The appellate court affirmed. It rejected claimant’s contention that the Commission had no discretion to deny the motion. The court held that the plain language of section 24 gave the Commission the discretion to grant or deny the motion and that the Commission properly considered the financial soundness of the employer and insurance carrier in denying the motion.

Claimant alleged two separate work related injuries while working for the same employer. Two separate insurance carriers were on the risk for the injuries. The second carrier claimed that claimant’s injuries were a continuation of the initial injury, that no new accident occurred and that his condition did not objectively change after the alleged intervening injury. The second injury was not reported to the treating physician and the employer’s independent physician testified that the alleged second injury did not cause the need for surgery or objectively change his condition. The arbitrator found both cases compensable and but denied penalties, finding that the defense of the second claim was in good faith. The Commission affirmed the award but assessed penalties against on the second claim under sections 19(k), 19(l) and 16 since the only dispute was between the two insurance carriers. One commissioner dissented. The appellate court affirmed finding that penalties are appropriate when the liability of the employer is clear and the only dispute is which carrier is responsible for paying benefits.

Claimant rear-ended a semi truck while making deliveries. His employer denied the claim based on the fact that his driving was negligent and cocaine was found in a post-accident blood test. The arbitrator found the claimant’s testimony not credible and inconsistent concerning his memory of the accident but found the claim compensable and awarded benefits. The Commission affirmed. The appellate court affirmed the Commission. It held that while the claimant’s operation of the employer’s vehicle was negligent, his actions did not remove him from the scope of his employment or the protection of the Act. In order to remove himself from the protections of the Act, his actions must have been committed intentionally, with knowledge that they were likely to result in serious injury, or with wanton disregard of the probable consequences. Further, in order for intoxication to warrant denial of a claim, it must be such that it can be said as a matter of law that the injury arose out of the intoxicated condition and not the employment. Intoxication that does not incapacitate a claimant from performing his work-related duties is not sufficient to defeat recovery of compensation under the Act even though the intoxication may be a contributing cause of the injury.

Claimant’s application for adjustment of claim was filed by attorney Goldstein. Claimant then retained attorney Ribbeck who filed a substitution attorney signed by claimant. Goldstein file a petition for attorneys fees and the arbitrator ordered that claimant and the employer provide notice to Goldstein upon resolution of the claim and that no drafts be issued until the fee petition was fully resolved. Two years later claimant filed a second application for adjustment of claim and dismissed the first application without notice to Goldstein. The claim was then settled and no notice was given to Goldstein. Goldstein learned of the settlement seven months after the contract had been approved and filed a petition for fees pursuant to section 16 of the Act. The Commission ordered Ribbeck to pay Goldstein fees in the amount of $1,350 and further found that the matter should be referred to the ARDC. Claimant appealed. The appellate court reversed the Commission holding that the approved settlement was final unless a petition for review was filed within 20 days. Thus, the Commission had no jurisdiction to hear the fee petition. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. It agreed that the Commission had no jurisdiction to reopen or reconsider the contract, a final award, however, the section 16 fee petition was between claimant’s attorneys and did not require that the award be reopened or reconsidered. Therefore, the Commission had jurisdiction to adjudicate the section 16 fee petition.

Claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim and subsequently died for unrelated reasons prior to his claim being heard. Claimant’s widow pursued the claim and an award for TTD and medical expenses was awarded by the arbitrator. The Commission affirmed the decision but remanded the case to the arbitrator with instructions to take additional evidence on the wage issue. The claimant’s widow subsequently died and the employer moved to dismiss the claim. The arbitrator dismissed the claim ruling that he had no jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Commission reversed, finding that the claim did not abate after the claimant’s death. The circuit court reversed the Commission under section 8(h) of the Act. The appellate court reversed the circuit court and affirmed the Commission. It held section 8(h) inapplicable because all of the benefits at issue accrued prior to the claimant’s death. Relying on Republic Steel v. Industrial Comm’n, 26 Ill.2d 32 (1962), it found that section 8(h) applies only to future unpaid, unaccrued benefits. Unpaid benefits but accrued prior to claimant’s death are assets of the estate.

The arbitrator and Commission allowed medical bills into evidence based solely on the testimony of the claimant. The appellate court reversed finding that neither the foundational requirements of Supreme Court Rule 236(a) (business records) nor any foundational evidence regarding the reasonableness of the charges was offered. It noted that the foundation for business records can be made by made by the custodian of the records or any other person familiar with the business and its mode of operation. Foundation for the reasonableness of the charges can be provided either by showing that the bills have been paid or with the testimony of a person having knowledge of the services rendered and the usual and customary charges for such services. The claimant’s testimony alone was clearly insufficient.

Claimant submitted medical reports of physicians retained by the employer to perform section 12 medical exams. The employer objected to the reports at the time of trial but the arbitrator admitted the reports as an admission against interest and Commission affirmed the evidentiary ruling. The appellate court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, an expert witness is not an agent of the party who hired him, and therefore, the expert’s statements and opinions are not admissible as admissions against that party’s interest. Further, the report was not admissible under Fencl-Tufo v. Industrial Comm’n, 169 Ill.App.3d 510 (1988) because the physician was not hired to assist in the treatment of claimant. The court also found the admission of additional reports improper when an objection to the authenticity of the documents was made and no foundation was laid.

The arbitrator and Commission calculated the claimant’s average weekly wage by dividing the total number of hours worked by 40 hours to arrive at that total number of weeks worked. The total wages were then divided by the number of weeks worked. The appellate court reversed. It held, under the third method set forth in Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill.2d 225 (2001), that the number of weeks worked is to be calculated by dividing the total number of days worked by the number of days in a full work week.

Finally, the court ruled that the claimant’s failure to raise penalties in the petition for review did not constitute a waiver of that issue since the claimant raised penalties in his statement of exceptions. The court noted that Commission Rule 7040.70(d) provides that the jurisdiction of the Commission is not limited to the exceptions stated in the petition for review.

Claimant worked for RLI in Peoria for seven years as a policy administrator. She filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Commission on January 12, 2001. She testified that she knew that she was having problems with her wrists in 1997 and that she told her supervisor that year that she believed that her condition was work related. The arbitrator found the case compensable but the Commission reversed finding that the claim was not filed within the statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed the Commission’s denial of the claim. It noted that the “accident date” in a repetitive trauma claim is the date on which the injury manifests itself. The date of manifestation is the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant’s employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person. Claimant argued that condition manifested itself on the date she had an EMG that confirmed the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome. The court noted that manifestation date does not require that a physician diagnose a claimant or that a physician opine that the injury is causally connected to the employment. It ruled that the claimant’s belief in 1997 that her condition was related to her work activities was sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations. Petition for leave to the Illinois Supreme Court was allowed on December 1, 2005.

Claimant generally worked five day, 40 hour weeks. Hoever, during the 52 week period prior to his industrial injury, he was laid off occasionally and missed work because his infant daughter was critically ill and required numerous hospitalizations. The arbitrator determined that claimant worked 44 weeks by deducting "the number of weeks and parts thereof" that claimant was laid off. She did not deduct the time claimant spent taking his daughter to the hospital since work was available but claimant chose not to work. The Commission held that claimant worked a total of 181.25 days or 36.25 weeks and therefore divided claimant’s total earnings by 36.25 to calculate his average weekly wage. On appeal, the employer argued that the Commission should not have deducted as lost time for those days claimant did not work because he was providing care for his critically ill daughter because work was available and claimant chose not to work. The appellate court upheld the Commission’s calculation and held that section 10 plainly states that in all cases where the employee loses five or more days of work during the 52 weeks prior to the injury, the lost time (to the extent not due to the fault of the employee) should be deducted from the wage calculation denominator. It further held that the evidence was clear that the time lost was not due to the fault of claimant.

The arbitrator awarded claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and the respondent filed a petition for review. While the case was pending review, the employer scheduled a section 12 examination on May 27, 1999 and claimant refused to attend because he was not receiving compensation. On review, the arbitrator’s TTD award was upheld by the Commission. Respondent then paid the award and an additional amount of TTD up to May 27, 1999, the point where claimant refused to attend the section 12 examination. In a subsequent hearing, the arbitrator found that no TTD was payable after May 27, 1999, relying on the plain language of section 12 that permits an employer to suspend TTD when an employee refuses to submit himself to examination. The Commission reversed and awarded TTD after May 27, 1999 finding that claimant was not required to attend the section 12 examination because he was not receiving compensation. On appeal, claimant argued that if an employer places an employee's entitlement to receive benefits in dispute by challenging liability, then the employer loses the right to rely on the examination requirement and suspension-of-benefits remedy provided by section 12. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the Commission. It held that claimant was required to submit himself for examination in May 1999 to avoid suspension of his benefits. It noted that no Illinois court has ever stated that the number of section 12 examinations is limited to any specific amount, though it has been continuously noted that section 12 cannot be used to harass or oppress an employee by requesting unnecessary examinations. In this case there was a legitimate basis for the employer’s request for an examination so the suspension of benefits for the failure to attend the exam was justified.

Claimant was employed as a delivery driver and claimed he injured his back lifting a 45 pound package when making deliveries. Four days later he went to the emergency room and complained he injured his low back while lifting heavy boxes. Claimant testified that he reported the injury to his employer. However, the employer presented testimony from five witnesses who testified that the claimant gave no notice of injuring his back at work.

The Industrial Commission found the case compensable even though it noted that the claimant had little credibility. It gave more weight to the statements that he gave to the initial medical providers than to his testimony at Trial. The Appellate Court reversed holding that the findings of the Commission defied logic since it found the claimant’s testimony at hearing under oath was not credible but found the statements that he made to the medical providers truthful. Based on that inconsistency, the Appellate Court found that the Industrial Commission’s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence since the claimant was not believable.

Claimant testified that while working as a hostess for the employer she was walking customers to their seats when she tripped and fell on carpet. She testified that her right foot stuck on the carpet but she did not see any food, liquid, foreign object or any other defect in the carpet that caused her fall. The employer did not issue the claimant shoes but mandated that she wear a rubber soled shoe as a part of her job. The Arbitrator found that the claimant’s injuries did not arise out of her employment. The Industrial Commission reversed finding it reasonable that a rubber sole would stick on the texture of the carpeting and that the new walking surface contributed to her injury. The Appellate Court affirmed a finding that there was evidence that the carpeting presented the claimant with an increased risk of injury because of the fact that the carpet was newly installed and contributed to her injury. Therefore, it affirmed the Industrial Commission’s reversal of the Arbitrator.

OVERRULED BY ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT IN 2007
The claimant and his employer settled his workers’ compensation claim for $230,000.00. At the time the case was settled, claimant was pursuing a medical malpractice claim that related to the work related injury. Upon settlement of the medical malpractice claim, the employer filed a Motion to Adjudicate the Lien in Circuit Court. The Circuit Court held that the employer was entitled to be reimbursed $175,000.00 from the medical malpractice settlement. On appeal, the claimant argued that the Defendant was not entitled to reimbursement because the settlement contract concluded all issues for $230,000.00. The Appellate Court agreed finding that the employer’s failure to retain its lien rights in the settlement contract amounted to a waiver of its rights under Section 5(b).

Claimant delivered trusses that were secured to a flat bed truck with an average of ten straps per load. The straps were tightened with either a wrench or a pry bar. The claimant testified that tightening the straps required the application of substantial force so that the load would not shift when the truck was moving. The Arbitrator found that claimant failed to prove a causal connection between his condition of ill being and his employment activities. The Industrial Commission reversed and found the case compensable. The employer argued that the claimant spent less than 10% and probably closer to 2% of his work day tying down loads. In affirming the Industrial Commission, the Appellate Court noted that there is no legal requirement that a certain percentage of the work day be spent on a task in order to support a finding of repetitive trauma. It held that the issue for the Industrial Commission to decide was whether the job activity was repeated sufficiently to cause the injury. The repetitive nature of the task performed by the claimant is relevant only to the question of whether the task caused the condition. The Appellate Court concluded that the Industrial Commission’s finding of causation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Claimant suffered a heart attack at work after performing heavy labor. His treating physician testified that he suffered a 90% occlusion and characterized him as a “heart attack waiting to happen.” The Appellate Court reversed the Industrial Commission’s finding and found his claim not compensable because any normal activity could have caused the heart attack. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court relying on its ruling in Sisbro where it held that the “normal daily activity exception” no longer exists after Sisbro. It upheld the Industrial Commission decision since there was sufficient evidence in the record to support its conclusion that the work activity aggravated or accelerated the pre existing condition and lead to the heart attack. The Court further held that the employee need only prove that some act or phase of the employment was a causative factor of the resulting injury and the mere fact that the employee might have suffered a fatal heart attack even if not working is immaterial.

The Arbitrator and Industrial Commission found claimant’s bilateral avascularacrosis causally related connected to a work injury and awarded benefits. The employer appealed challenging the Industrial Commission finding of accidental injury and medical causation. The employer named the Industrial Commission as a party to its Notice of Appeal to the Circuit Court but failed to list the Industrial Commission as a party on the Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court ruled that the failure to list the Industrial Commission as a named party on the Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Court is not fatal to its exercise of jurisdiction over the claim because the Industrial Commission is not an indispensable party. The remaining findings of the Industrial Commission were affirmed.

Petitioner claimed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome from allegedly repetative work activities. Counsel for respondent objected to Dr. Glasgow's causation opinion based on Ghere v. Industrial Comm'n 278 Ill. App. 3d 840 (1996). In overruling the objection and allowing the testimony, the court noted that respondent knew in advance that claimant treated with Dr. Glasgow for carpal tunnel syndrom, and thus, should not have been surprised that the doctor rendered opinions regarding causation. Absent some sort of surprise, the testimony was admissable.

Claimant worked for employer as a coal miner for 37 years. He retired in 1997 when the coal mine was shut down. The Arbitrator denied benefits based on the examining physician who concluded that the claimant’s condition of ill being was related to his twenty year smoking history. The Industrial Commission reversed, relying on the employee’s treating and examining physicians. The Appellate court upheld the Industrial Commission decision finding that there was evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision so that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A decision of the Arbitrator was filed on November 27, 2000 and neither party appealed. On March 14, 2001 the claimant filed a Petition for Penalties under Section 19(k) and 16 for failure to pay the award. On the same date, the employer sent payment of the award with interest via overnight mail to the claimant explaining that the award had not been previously paid due to personnel changes at the third party administrator. The Industrial Commission denied claimant’s Petition for Penalties however the Circuit Court reversed and awarded attorney’s fees under Section 16(k) and penalties under Section 19(k) in the amount of 50% of the award. In reversing the Circuit Court, the Appellate Court noted that the delay of 78 days was not unusually long. Further, the voluntary payment of interest showed the employer’s conduct was not vexatious or intentional. Finally, the Court noted that while penalties under Section 19(l) are mandatory, substantial penalties under Section 16 and 19(k) are discretionary and require a finding of factious or intentional refusal to pay which was not present in the instant case.

In 1969 the claimant was hired by United Airlines in Illinois. In 1993 the claimant was transferred to Florida and became a resident there. He was then injured in 1999 in Florida. The Arbitrator and Industrial Commission found no jurisdiction in Illinois but the Appellate Court reversed. It held that the site is of the contract for hire is the sole determinant of jurisdiction under the Act for injuries occurring outside of Illinois. The fact that there was a thirty year lapse in time between the claimant’s date of hire in Illinois and the fact that he changed his residence to Florida did not terminate jurisdiction in Illinois.

The employer sought to modify a wage differential award more than thirty months after the award had been entered under Section 8(d)1. The Court ruled that any motion to modify the award must be brought under Section 19(h) within thirty months of the award and no such relief is allowable under Section 8(d)1. Therefore, the Motion to Modify the Award was dismissed with prejudice.

Claimant sustained an undisputed work injury and subsequently underwent a cervical fusion. While recovering from the fusion, he was involved in a motor vehicle accident that aggravated the fusion. The Industrial Commission found that the motor vehicle accident was an intervening cause and that the Respondent was not liable for the failed fusion. The Appellate Court reversed and found that the motor vehicle accident did not break the causal connection between the work injury and the failed fusion because the claimant had not yet recovered from the first surgery. It held that the motor vehicle accident was not an intervening cause even if it caused the failed fusion because the failed fusion would not have occurred but for the work injury. It distinguished other cases where intervening causes were found based on the fact that these cases involved full recoveries from the work injury before the intervening injury whereas the claimant was still off and recovering in this case.