Claimant settled three claims with his employer on three separate contracts. One settlement was for $50,000.00 and the other two were for $1.00 with an indication of no lost time. The claimant then filed and recovered $400,000.00 in a civil claim arising out of one of the accidents that settled for $1.00. The employer then asserted a lien in the amount of $90,000.00 claiming that all three cases were negotiated in unity and that some or most of the $50,000.00 settlement was attributed to the settlement contract that showed a settlement of $1.00. In quashing the lien, the Court noted that the plain language of the settlement contract governed the amount of the lien. Therefore the lien was quashed.

The Appellate Court reversed an award of TTD and penalties because the evidence showed that the claimant reached MMI in October of 2000. The Commission’s award of TTD after that date was reversed as were penalties for the failure to pay TTD. However, no credit was given to the Respondent for TTD paid when the Petitioner worked twenty hours per week. The benefits were considered maintenance during rehabilitation.

Decedent’s surviving spouse claimed her husband’s death due to lung cancer was caused by his exposure to coal dust while employed by Respondent. The decedent had previously obtained an award for co workers pneumoconiosis and mild obstructive airways disease. The Arbitrator and Industrial Commission denied death benefits and the Appellate Court affirmed. It rejected claimant’s contention that lung cancer qualifies as a respirable disease under Section 1(d) of the Occupational Disease Act. It is found that the Industrial Commission’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence given the treating physician’s opinions and the general consensus that lung cancer is not related to coal dust exposure.

Claimant submitted himself to an independent medical exam with Dr. Gary Skaletzky who later reviewed a videotape and rendered an unfavorable opinion to the claimant. The employer refused to provide the claimant with a copy of the videotape so claimant filed an Equitable Bill of Discovery in Circuit Court. In affirming the Trial Court’s dismissal of the bill of discovery, the Appellate Court noted that an equitable bill of discovery is an artifact of the era preceding the liberal allowance of discovery. Moreover, permitting the claimant to circumvent the Industrial Commission’s procedural rules could substantially undermine the intent of the Act.

Claimant worked on an assembly line in a position that required her to step off a four to six inch platform to place parts on a table. She performed this activity approximately once every two minutes during the work day. On the date of the alleged work injury, she stepped off the platform and experienced a sudden onset of pain in her foot and eventually required surgery for tarsal tunnel syndrome. The employer argued that negotiating a four to six inch step constituted a risk to which the general public is exposed daily, and in the absence of a defect, the activity did not constitute an accident under the Act. The Industrial Commission and affirming Appellate Court held that the claimant was exposed to an increased risk because she was exposed to a common risk more frequently than the general public. Therefore the case was found compensable.

Petitioner who claimed a disabling back injury was videotaped performing heavy work activities when he claimed to be totally disabled from work. The Arbitrator found the case compensable but the Industrial Commission reversed finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that he sustained accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment with the employer. The Appellate Court rejected the claimant’s argument that the Industrial Commission ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The tape clearly provided a basis for the Industrial Commission’s decision.

The appellate court held that the Industrial Commission improperly admitted hospital records without proper certification under section 16 of the Act. Further, records of treating physicians prepared at the request of claimant’s attorney are subject to a hearsay objection and arenot admissible under Fencl-Tufo.

Claimant was discharged from his position as a probationary laborer from the Chicago Department of Water and brought a claim for retaliatory discharge for exercising his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The appellate court upheld the entry of summary judgment in favor of the city of Chicago. It held that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act barred the action because the discharge was a discretionary policy determination which gave rise to governmental immunity.

Claimant arrived at work and parked in a lot designated, but not owned or maintained, by the employer. The crowded conditions of the parking lot required claimant to park close to an SUV. While squeezing out of her vehicle with her uniform in hand, claimant twisted her knee and sustained a torn meniscus. The arbitrator made an award but the Industrial Commission found the case not compensable. The appellate court upheld the decision of the Industrial Commission and held that the risk of exiting a motor vehicle confronts all members of the general public. Thus, the claim was not compensable.

Claimant suffered an aggravation of a preexisting shoulder injury. The arbitrator awarded 45% of an arm and the Industrial Commission awarded 40% of a person. The appellate court reversed and awarded a wage differential under section 8(d)1 despite the fact that claimant accepted a lower paying job as a security guard, refused to apply for higher paying positions with the employer, and was found by the Commission not to have shown any evidence of an appropriate job search.

Robert Madigan was appointed commissioner on January 1, 2001. Upon his resignation, Governor George Ryan appointed Paul Rink as a temporary commissioner until a permanent commissioner was appointed. At the same time, Ryan appointed Diane Ford to the position held by Rink. Ford signed the decision of the Industrial Commission. The appellate court raised the issue of the constitution of the panel sua sponte. It held that the decision of the Commission was valid despite the improper appointment of Ford. Under the Defacto Officer Doctrine, the Industrial Commission decision was valid because Ford was acting under color of title.

Claimant injured his shoulder on January 17, 2000 in the course of his employment. He reached a state of maximum medical improvement on March 21, 2001. On April 10, 2001 he initiated his own job search. Respondent offered formal vocational rehabilitation on September 21, 2001. The Industrial Commission awarded 50% of a person, TTD to March 21, 2001 and maintenance to September 21, 2001. Respondent argued that maintenance was not payable from March 21, 2001 to September 21, 2001 because claimant had not requested vocational rehabilitation and it had not been offered. The appellate court disagreed holding that maintenance payments were payable during claimant’s job search because it qualified as a self-initiated rehabilitation plan under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.

Claimant worked in a coal mine for 22 years and retired in 1977. Within six months of his retirement, claimant was examined at his attorney’s request and was found to have coal worker’s pneumonoconiosis. Claimant was also examined by the employer’s physician who found no disease. The Industrial Commission found the case compensable and the appellate court affirmed. The court noted that it is the function of the Industrial Commission to decide conflicting medical evidence and its decision will only be set aside if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Claimant worked as an asphalt driver from March through November from 1979 to 1996 making $22.59 per hour. In the winter of 1997, while laid off from his asphalt job, he was injured while working for a temporary employer. As a result of the injury, he became disabled from his work as an asphalt driver and could earn only $9 per hour. The arbitrator awarded a wage differential including both wages in the calculation of the average weekly wage. The Industrial Commission reversed and held that the asphalt wages were not to be included under section 10. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the wages as an asphalt driver would be included in the calculation of the average weekly wage even though the claimant was laid off at the time of his injury. It included the asphalt wages because of his employment history of rehire after the layoff in addition to the fact that he was subject to rehire at any time during the layoff. Thus, claimant’s relationship with his asphalt employer was not wholly severed at the time of his injury.

Claimant worked as a CNA and parked her car in the employer’s parking lot. After punching in, she returned to her care to retrieve a tool. Upon returning to the employers building, she tripped and fell on the uneven surface of the employer’s sidewalk. The arbitrator found the case compensable but the Industrial Commission reversed and found the claim non-compensable. The appellate court reversed the Commission and found the case compensable. Contrary to the Commission’s finding, it held that the uneven surface of the sidewalk (approximately a 1.25 inch variation) constituted a defect and that claimant was exposed to the defective sidewalk more frequently than the general public.

The arbitrator held that claimant’s seizure disorder was not related to the work injury. The Industrial Commission reversed and held that claimant’s seizures were related to the work injury. The Commission relied on the testimony of the treating physician who stated that “it is quite possibl[e] that he may have had an occult head injury at the time of his fall that only manifested itself later on.” The appellate ourt affirmed, ruling that the Commission’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court went on to hold that the Commission’s calculation of the average weekly wage under Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 756 N.E.2d 822, 258 Ill. Dec. 548 (2001) was proper, even though it applied Sylvester retroactively.

Respondent filed an appeal of a 19g decision reducing an award to a judgment but failed to include in the brief a copy of the arbitrator’s decision and a copy of the Commission’s decision in the appendix as required by Supreme Court Rule 341. Further, respondent failed to respond to a rule to show cause why the brief should not be stricken. Thus, the claimant’s motion to dismiss the appeal was granted.

Claimant injured his back while unloading five-gallon buckets of driveway sealer from a pallet. During the deposition of claimant’s treating neurosurgeon, respondent objected to the neurosurgeon’s causal connection opinions based on Ghere v. Industrial Comm’n, 278 Ill. App. 3d 840 (1996) since the opinion was not disclosed prior to the deposition. The Industrial Commission allowed the testimony, ruling that the testimony was not a surprise to respondent and was thus admissible. The Appellate Court upheld the Commission’s evidentiary ruling, noting that Ghere does not require the exclusion of such opinions when there is no prior disclosure absent a finding of unfair surprise. Since the treating neurosurgeon mentioned claimant’s neck and back in his records, the respondent should have anticipated that the doctor would testify about the causal relationship between the neck condition and claimant’s work accident.

Claimant tripped over a box while working at a delicatessen and suffered a comminuted fracture of the left tibia and fibula. The treating physician noted that petitioner had some loss of function, would not be able to return to delicatessen work and was not sure whether vocational rehabilitation was appropriate given his age. The arbitrator awarded 60% loss of use of the leg. The Industrial Commission reversed and awarded permanent and total disability benefits. The appellate court upheld the award of total and permanent disability despite the fact that claimant failed to introduce any evidence that work was not available to him.

While the case was on appeal relative to a prior 19b award, petitioner was instructed not to attend a medical exam scheduled by respondent pursuant to section 12 of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. In a subsequent 19b hearing, the Industrial Commission awarded TTD benefits even though claimant refused to attend the section 12 exam. The appellate court reversed and held that claimant’s refusal to attend a section 12 exam required a suspension of TTD so no benefits could be awarded after the date the claimant refused to attend the exam. The Commission reasoned that since respondent was contesting the claimant’s right to receive benefits under the Act during the 19b appeal, and had not paid claimant any such benefits at the time it requested the examination, a suspension of TTD was not required. This reasoning was flatly rejected by the court. It held that claimant’s compliance with section 12 is not restricted to cases where the employer acknowledges his liability and makes compensation payments. It applies to all cases where the employee is entitled to receive disability payments, and whether he is entitled to them is not dependent on whether the employer acknowledges liability by making payments.

The Industrial Commission denied benefits to a claimant who was involved in an altercation with a co-worker. The court noted that generally, injuries arising from an assault by a co-worker at the workplace during work hours are compensable if the assault arose in the course of a dispute involving the conduct of the work. However, where the party seeking compensation was the aggressor, the party’s acts are not within the scope of employment and are not compensable. The Industrial Commission held that both parties to the fight were mutual combatants and denied benefits. The appellate court reversed and held that as a matter of law, there cannot be two aggressors. Only the initial aggressor is to be denied benefits. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that a typical fight involving two employees has only one aggressor. The case was remanded to the Industrial Commission for a determination of whether claimant was the aggressor.

Twice Over Clean involved a petitioner who suffered a heart attack. Claimant testified that he was engaged in removing asbestos that had previously been collected into large bags, each of which weighed around 40 to 45 pounds. Later that evening, he had a heart attack. There was medical testimony for and against causation. The appellate court in Twice Over Clean I, 337 Ill. App. 3d 805, 786 N.E.2d 1096, 272 Ill. Dec. 262 (3d Dist. 2003) noted that it is well established that a preexisting heart disease will not preclude a workers’ compensation award for a heart attack where work-related stress contributed to the heart attack. However, one exception to this rule is when the heart disease is so far gone that any stress, even the most ordinary exertion, will bring on the heart attack. The appellate court reversed the Industrial Commission and relied on Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 327 Ill. App. 3d 868, 764 N.E.2d 1163, 262 Ill. Dec. 46 (4th Dist. 2002) (Sisbro I).

Sisbro I held that a claimant is not entitled to compensation, regardless of whether his condition was caused by work, if his physical condition was so deteriorated that his condition of ill-being could have been produced by normal daily activities. The Illinois Supreme Court issued Sisbro II, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 797 N.E.2d 665, 278 Ill. Dec. 70 (2003), which reversed Sisbro I and held that the “Normal Daily Activity Exception” applies where the preexisting condition alone was the cause of the injury. Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court in Twice Over Clean to vacate its judgment and to reconsider it in light of Sisbro II.

On reconsideration in Twice Over Clean II, the appellate court maintained its reversal of the Industrial Commission and held that the normal daily activity limitation barred compensation. It noted that “any activity or no activity could put sufficient stress on petitioner’s heart to result in a myocardial infarction.” The appellate court was careful to note that its decision did not violate the analytical framework set forth in Sisbro II since it did not hold that claimant proved a causal connection and deny compensation. Rather, it held that petitioner failed to prove “sufficient causal connection” between his work and his injury. It held that a work activity is a “sufficient cause” of the aggravation of a preexisting condition if the work activity presented risks greater than to which the general public is exposed and the claimant’s condition was not so deteriorated that his injury could have occurred through normal daily activity.

Because petitioner’s condition was so deteriorated that any normal activity would have been sufficient to cause petitioner’s heart attack, he failed to prove sufficient causal connection between his work and his subsequent heart attack to receive workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, the decision of the Industrial Commission awarding him benefits is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Opinion issued after original was ordered vacated by Supreme Court in light of Sisbro). This decision was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Claimant was awarded benefits by the arbitrator. The Industrial Commission reversed and found claimant not credible. Claimant argued that the appellate court should weigh the Commission’s decision with extra scrutiny because the Commission reversed the arbitrator who found him credible. The appellate court rejected claimant’s argument and specifically noted that it is the function of the Commission to decide questions of fact, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve conflicting evidence. The Commission’s determination on a question of fact will not be disturbed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Commission exercises original rather than appellate jurisdiction and is in no way bound by the arbitrator’s findings. It specifically rejected the argument that an extra degree of scrutiny must be applied to a decision of the Commission that reverses the decision of an arbitrator.

The Goldstein law firm filed claimant’s application for adjustment of claim in 1996. Claimant discharged Goldstein and hired Ribbeck as counsel. Ribbeck filed a second application for the same date of injury in 1999. In 1997, Goldstein filed a petition for attorney’s fees on the 1996 claim. Subsequently, the 1996 case was dismissed by claimant without notice to Goldstein and the 1999 case was settled. Five months after the settlement contract was approved, Goldstein filed a petition for attorney’s fees. The Industrial Commission granted Goldstein’s petition. The appellate court reversed and found that the Commission had no jurisdiction to reopen the case five months after a lump-sum contract had been approved. It noted that section 19(f) provides that a settlement contract becomes final unless a petition for review is filed within 20 days.

Claimant worked as a coal miner for approximately 25 years during which time he was exposed to, and breathed, coal mine dust. The claimant was employed by Peabody at its Eagle No. 2 mine. On July 12, 1993, Peabody closed that mine and the claimant has not worked as a miner since. On March 4, 1997, the claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Act asserting that he suffered shortness of breath as a result of his coal dust exposure. The court affirmed the Industrial Commission’s denial of benefits based on section 1(f) of the Occupational Disease Act because claimant did not prove that his disablement had occured within two years of his last exposure.

Petitioner worked as a waitress for respondent and slipped on ice as she was exiting her vehicle. The parking lot was public but petitioner was required to park in the rear of the lot. The Industrial Commission found the case not compensable but the appellate court reversed the Industrial Commission and found the fall compensable. It ruled that injuries sustained in a parking lot “provided by and under the control” of the employer are compensable. The court rejected any distinction between lots for the general public and lots used primarily by employees. It stated that the proper inquiry is whether the employer provides and maintains the lot for its employee’s use. The court distinguished Wal-Mart Stores v. Industrial Comm’n, 326 Ill. App. 3d 438, 761 N.E.2d 768, 260 Ill. Dec. 585 (4th Dist. 2001) on the basis that the employee in that case was being picked up by a friend. Thus, the employee was not acting under the employer’s control when she left the store to go on break.

The Industrial Commission awarded 29 weeks of TTD up to the point where petitioner reached maximum medical improvement. Claimant appealed arguing that the MMI finding presumed petitioner would not have additional surgery. His treating physicians had recommended additional surgery but also opined that claimant was at MMI if he elected against surgery. Although claimant testified at trial that he wanted to proceed with the surgery, he had taken no affirmative steps to undergo the surgery prior to trial. The appellate court held that the Industrial Commission’s decision that the 19-month delay between the surgical recommendation and the testimony at trial was sufficient to deny additional TTD. Otherwise, a claimant could intentionally delay the process for the purpose of securing additional TTD. However, the Industrial Commission’s award of 29 weeks of TTD was increased to 84 weeks since that is what the employer stipulated to at trial. The court noted that stipulations on the Request for Hearing form are binding on the parties.

Petitioner’s claim was dismissed for want of prosecution on 4-21-99, a timely petition to reinstate was filed on 6-28-99 but the motion was not set for hearing until 2-28-01. The appellate court upheld the Industrial Commission’s refusal to reinstate the case. It noted that Industrial Commission Rule 7020.90(a) requires a claimant to file a petition to reinstate within 60 days of its receipt of the order of dismissal, and the petition must set forth the date on which the petitioner will appear before the arbitrator to present the petition. In this case, petitioner failed to set forth the hearing date on the petition and failed to set the motion for hearing for almost three years. The refusal to reinstate was held to be within the sound discretion of the Industrial Commission which applied “standards of fairness and equity.”