The employer filed a judicial appeal of an award by the Industrial Commission. It filed with the circuit clerk a bond that was not signed by the principal but was accepted by the circuit clerk. The circuit court dismissed the appeal, and the appellate
court upheld the dismissal. Strict compliance with section 19(f) of the Act is required. The court noted that the purpose of requiring a bond is to bind the principal. A bond without the signature of the principal does not further that purpose. In addition, the circuit clerk’s acceptance of the faulty bond is not dispositive of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A judicial appeal of an order of the circuit court remanding the case back to the Industrial Commission is not allowed. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to review of final judgments. The only exception is an appeal under Supreme Court Rule 306(a) which requires the movant to file a petitioner for leave to appeal.

On June 29, 2001, the arbitrator issued a decision. On July 26, 2001, the employer filed a petition for review of that decision. The arbitrator, on motion of the claimant, issued a “corrected decision” on July 27, 2001. The employer failed to file a petition for review of the “corrected decision.” The appellate court held that strict compliance with section 19(f) of the Act is
required. The employer was required to file a petition for review of the corrected decision so the appeal was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Counsel for the employer sought a continuance of a trial because a witness failed to appear pursuant to subpoena. The arbitrator refused to continue the case. Since defense counsel failed to request enforcement of the subpoena by the arbitrator,
the issue was waived. Further, the appellate court reversed the Industrial Commission’s inclusion of overtime in the average weekly wage when petitioner failed to offer any proof that petitioner was required to work overtime as a condition of his employment or that the overtime was part of his regular hours of employment.

In 1997, respondent sought to reduce its premium costs for workers’ compensation Page 6 Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen
insurance by rejecting insurance coverage for a vice president. In 1997, General Casualty issued an endorsement excluding the vice president from coverage. No further premiums were paid to General Casualty for coverage of the vice president. In 1999,
the vice president injured himself on the job and filed a workers’ compensation claim. General Casualty denied coverage, and the trial court granted summary judgment in its favor. The appellate court reversed, holding that the rejection of coverage signed by the vice president was ambiguous. It clearly waived coverage but did not withdraw the vice president from coverage
of the Act. It further held that by choosing to purchase insurance, the employer sought to cover all employees including the vice president. The court rejected General Casualty’s contention that it was free to remove coverage for any employee at any time.

The decedent fell while working at Builders Square and died shortly thereafter. The treating medical evidence showed the decedent’s death was caused by a hematoma and subarachnoid hemorrage most likely caused by trauma. The respondent’s examining physician felt the fall was idiopathic. There was no direct evidence as to the cause of the fall. The Industrial Commission reversed the arbitrator and ruled that petitioner failed to prove an accident and a causal connection between the decedent’s work and her death. The appellate court affirmed. It noted that the label “unexplained fall” is a misnomer. It held that a claimant must present evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the fall stemmed from an employment-related risk. A pure unexplained-fall could not be compensable given Illinois’ rejection of the Positional Risk Doctrine. In this case, petitioner failed to present evidence supporting an inference that the decedent’s unexplained fall arose out of her employment.

Claimant suffered an eye injury while employed by the respondent. The Commission found an average weekly wage of $56 and awarded wage differential benefits of $362.36 (the statutory minimum). In addition to working for respondent, petitioner was employed as a seasonal truck driver for a construction company. Claimant sought to include the truck driving wages under Jacobs v. Industrial Comm’n, 269 Ill. App. 3d 444, 646 N.E.2d 312, 206 Ill. Dec. 945 (2d Dist.1995). The appellate court ruled that Jacobs was limited to the situation where the concurrent employment was intended to supplement the other wages. In this case, petitioner’s work for respondent was a substitute for his seasonal work. Therefore, the seasonal employment was not included in the average weekly wage calculation.

Petitioner lost his right arm in an accident while working for respondent. At the time of trial the parties stipulated that petitioner had received 147 weeks of TTD and 114 weeks of PPD. The Industrial Commission awarded a wage differential under section 8(d)(1) of the Act and gave a credit for 114 weeks of PPD paid for the statutory amputation. Petitioner appealed and claimed he was entitled to the wage differential award from the date of the injury in addition to the TTD paid. The appellate court rejected petitioner’s argument and affirmed the award of the Commission which started the wage differential payments on the date petitioner began working. A claimant is not entitled to TTD and wage differential payments for the same time period.

Claimant sought benefits for a degenerative condition in his right foot. He twisted his right ankle in a pothole while delivering dairy products for Sisbro. The Industrial Commission found the case compensable and awarded benefits. The appellate court reversed the Commission. It held that claimant was not entitled to compensation, regardless of whether his condition of ill-being was caused by a work-related aggravation of a pre-existing condition, if his physical condition was so deteriorated that his condition of ill-being could have been produced by normal daily activity. The court acknowledged that claimant’s condition (Charcot arthropathy) was caused by the work injury but denied compensation because any activity could have caused the condition given his pre-existing diabetic neuropathy.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. It ruled that the decision of the Industrial Commission finding compensability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence before the Commission was enough for it to have concluded that the occupational activity was a causative factor in hastening claimant’s contraction of Charcot. Further, the court explained that the “Normal Daily Activity Exception” applies where the pre-existing condition alone was the cause of the injury.

The Industrial Commission denied benefits to a claimant who was involved in an altercation with a co-worker. The court noted that generally, injuries arising from an assault by a co-worker at the workplace during work hours are compensable if the assault arose in the course of a dispute involving the conduct of the work. However, where the party seeking compensation was the aggressor, the party’s acts are not within the scope of employment and are not compensable. The Industrial Commission held that both parties to the fight were mutual combatants and denied benefits. The appellate court reversed and held that as a matter of law, there cannot be two aggressors. Only the initial aggressor is to be denied benefits. Thus, the case was remanded to the Industrial Commission for a finding of fact as to which party was the initial aggressor.

Claimant testified that he was engaged in removing asbestos that had previously been collected into large bags, each of which weighed around 40 to 45 pounds. Later that evening, he had a heart attack. There was medical testimony for and against causation. The appellate court noted that it is well established that pre-existing heart disease will not preclude a workers’ compensation award for a heart attack where work-related stress contributed to the heart attack. However, one exception to this rule is when the heart disease is so far gone that any stress, even the most ordinary exertion, will bring on the heart attack. Doyle v. Industrial Comm’n, 86 Ill. 2d 544, 550, 427 N.E.2d 1223, 56 Ill. Dec. 677 (1981). The appellate court denied benefits relying on Sisbro before it was reversed by the Supreme Court. It held that whether the heart attack occurred at work or later was insignificant. Claimant’s own physician agreed that claimant was a heart attack waiting to happen and that claimant could have suffered a heart attack even while at rest. Since claimant’s condition had so deteriorated that his heart attack could have been caused by any normal activity, it was not compensable.

Claimant slipped and fell on loose gravel in a parking lot on the way to work and fractured her knee. The parking lot was not owned or maintained by the employer but the employer reimbursed employees for their expense to park in the lot. In denying benefits, the appellate court noted that Illinois courts have repeatedly held that under the “general premises rule” when an employee slips and falls at a point off the employer’s premises while traveling to or from work, the resulting injuries do not arise out of and in the course of the employment and are not compensable under the Act. The only exceptions are when the employee’s presence at the location of the accident was required in the performance of his duties or when the parking lot is “provided by” the employer. Here, the employer did not: own, operate or maintain the parking lot; lease any parking spaces therein for use by her employees; assign any parking spaces in the lot for use by her employees; tell any of her employees to park in that lot, or any other parking lot for that matter; or enter into any agreement with the lot’s owner regarding the parking fees that her employees would be charged. Reimbursement for the parking expense was not enough to warrant a finding of compensability.

Pace sought review of the Industrial Commission’s decision awarding benefits. The circuit court reversed in part and remanded the case back to the Industrial Commission for additional findings. Pace then sought review of the original decision of the Commission but failed to review the decision made by the Commission on remand. The appellate court held that it had no jurisdiction over the matter because the original decision of the Commission was not a final and appealable order. Only the second decision of the Commission on remand was final and appealable. Pace should have appealed the decision on remand since an appeal from a final judgment draws in to issue all prior interlocutory orders which produced the final order.

Plaintiffs were volunteer firefighters who filed suit against the fire districtafter the fire truck they were riding on was involved in an accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Reddick Community Fire Protection District holding that plaintiffs were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act since they filed workers' compensation claims and received benefits. The appellate court reversed. The court held that a party who seeks and accepts workers' compensation benefits is prohibited from subsequently filing suit against the provider of those benefits. This rule applies even where the party receiving benefits is not an employee. One may not reap the benefits of the Act and then deny its applicability. However, a party may accept benefits voluntarily offered, and may even file a claim for benefits to protect his/her rights. It is only when one actively seeks benefits and obtains them as a result of those efforts that he/she is barred from pursuing a common law claim. Since plaintiffs in this case did not actively seek benefits, they were not barred from pursuing a civil action. To hold otherwise would allow employers to send payments to injured parties or bereaved families, characterize the payments as workers' compensation benefits, and terminate any option the employee or family might have to avoid the exclusivity-of-remedy rule under the Act.

Claimant sought benefits for injuries to his leg, head, neck, right shoulder, and back. The case was tried twice in 19(b) hearings by arbitrator Caliendo. It was tried a third time by arbitrator Akemann on permanency. Arbitrator Cliendo awarded TTD in the first hearing and found a causal connection between the industrial accident and petitioner's injuries to his leg, neck, right shoulder and back. No appeal was taken from that decision. Arbitrator Akemann found that there was no objective evidence of an injury to petitioner's head, neck, back or right shoulder. The Industrial Commission affirmed arbitrator Akemann's decision. Petitioner appealed claiming that arbitrator Caliendo's prior decision acted res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. The appellate court reversed the Industrial Commission and held that arbitrator Calendo's prior decision acted as "Law of the Case" thus precluding arbitrator Akemann from finding no causal connection between the industrial accident and petitioner's injuries to his neck, back, and right shoulder. It remanded the case to the Industrial Commission for findings of permanency on those injuries.

Claimant received a jury summons from Will County and reported to respondent as directed. She later received a $7 check from respondent. On her questionnaire, claimant indicated her occupation was teacher and identified the school district for which she worked. On June 13, 1994, while being escorted with a group of jurors to a jury holding area, claimant lost her footing on a stairway and was injured. She then filed a claim under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act against Will County alleging that she was an employee. The Industrial Commission denied compensability, and the appellate court affirmed. It held that absent a contract for hire, either express or implied, there can be no liability under the Act. In this case there was no employment agreement evidenced by an offer on the part of the county or state to employ claimant and no acceptance by claimant. Claimant had no choice to accept or decline jury duty, and issuing a jury summons is not an "offer." Thus, no employment relationship existed. Justice Goldenhersh dissented. He opined that section 1(b)(1) of the Act defines an "employee" as "[e]very person in the service of the State…" which required claimant to be considered an employee of Will County.

The Industrial Commission issued notices of noncompliance to plaintiffs alleging that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the insurance coverage requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act. During the Commission's investigation concerning plaintiffs' compliance with the Act, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the trial court which, among other things, sought a declaration that certain sections of the Act were unconstitutional, that the actions of the Commission against them were ultra vires, and that the Commission should be enjoined from proceeding against them at the administrative level based on a lack of jurisdiction. The Commission ultimately voluntarily dismissed its allegations against plaintiffs. The appellate court held that the constitutional challenge was properly dismissed because the Industrial Commission had dismissed its allegations against plaintiffs and plaintiffs' constitutional claim did not come within the "public interest" exception that would allow it to proceed. Further, the appellate court held that the Commission's actions were not ultra vires because it followed the statutory procedures outlined by section 4(d) of the Act.

Petitioner sustained a compensable work injury and received a PPD award from the arbitrator on November 9, 2000. No petition for review was filed. On March 14, 2001, petitioner filed a request for penalties under sections 16 and 19(k) of the Act. Respondent promptly paid the award upon receiving notice of the petition for penalties. The Industrial Commission declined to enter penalties because the claims supervisor and adjuster handling the file quit leaving the file unexamined. The Commission held that respondents delay in payment was not vexatious or intentional. The circuit court of Kane County reversed the Industrial Commission and imposed a 50% penalty under section 19(k) and remanded the case for a finding on attorney's fees under section 16 of the Act. Respondent filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court's order arguing that the Industrial Commission's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court held that respondent's appeal was premature. When the circuit court reverses a decision of an administrative agency and remands the case to the agency for further proceedings involving disputed questions of law or fact, the order is not final for purposes of appeal. If, however, the agency on remand has only to act in accordance with the directions of the court and conduct proceedings on uncontroverted incidental matters or merely make a mathematical calculation, then the order is final for purposes of appeal. In this case, the appellate court held that calculation of attorney's fees under section 16 of the act is not merely a mathematical calculation. Thus, the order of the circuit court was not final for purposes of appeal.

Petitioner worked for American Can from 1970 to 1995 and was exposed to excessive levels of noise. American Can was sold to Silgan Container Corporation in 1995, and petitioner continued his work at the same facility and experienced additional noise exposure. The arbitrator found the hearing loss compensable and allocated the loss between the two employers. The Supreme Court held that such an allocation is contrary to section 1(d) of the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act which provides: "The employer liable for the compensation in this Act provided shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease claimed upon regardless of the length of time of such last exposure ***." Thus, the last employer was responsible for the entire loss even though most of the exposure and hearing loss was attributed to the first employer.

Claimant sustained an injury while playing basketball at a company picnic. The Industrial Commission found that claimant's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and denied benefits. It reasoned that claimant's decision to play basketball while at the picnic was voluntary, and thus, his injuries were not compensable. The appellate court reversed. It held that the pivotal issue, which determines whether a recreational activity is within the coverage of the Act, is whether the employee is "ordered or assigned" to participate in the activity as stated in section 11 of the Act. In this case, claimant had the choice to either attend the picnic, take a personal/vacation day, or go without pay. The court held that as a matter of law where an employee must either go without pay or give up personal/vacation time in order to opt out of attending a company picnic, the only inference that can be drawn is that the employee was ordered or assigned the task of attending the picnic that day. It was as if the claimant's job assignment for that day was to attend the picnic. Just as on any normal workday, claimant had a choice. He could either report to his assigned duties for the day, or if he did not wish to work that day, he could take a personal/vacation day to receive pay for that day, or he could receive no pay for that day. Thus, claimant fell under section 11 of the act, and the injury was compensable.