Petitioner worked at Wal-Mart and fell on ice while walking to her car. The Industrial Commission found the case compensable and awarded benefits. Wal-Mart appealed to the Circuit Court. Section 19(f)(2) of the Act requires a party seeking circuit court review to file an appeal bond along with the written request for summons. The request for summons must be filed within 20 days of receipt of notice of the Commission's decision. No summons shall issue unless the party against whom the Commission rendered an award "shall upon the filing of his written request for such summons" file the bond with the clerk. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). The filing of the bond is requisite to conferring jurisdiction on the circuit court. Wal-Mart filed a copy of an appeal bond in a timely fashion, however, the original bond was not filed until five days after the period for filing the bond had expired. The appellate court held that even if filing a copy of the bond was "irregular," Wal-Mart substantially complied with section 19(f)(2)

The appellate court reversed the Industrial Commission and held that petitioner's fall did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The evidence was clear that the entire Wal-Mart parking lot was available for use by both patrons and employees alike. Parry did not park her own car in the lot that night. There was no evidence that anyone asked her to park there. Claimant's fall resulted from a hazard to which she and the general public were equally exposed; thus, her injury did not arise out of her employment.

Petitioner was employed by ANCC from 1970 to 1995 when the company was bought out by Silgan Container. Petitioner continued to work for Silgan at the same facility until filing a hearing loss claim in 1996. The arbitrator found both employers liable for petitioner's hearing loss and allocated the disability between the employers. ANCC appealed claiming it had no liability under section 1(d) which states: "The employer liable for the compensation in this Act provided shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease claimed upon regardless of the length of time of such last exposure..." The appellate court agreed and found that Silgan was "the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease claimed" within the meaning of the Act. 820 ILCS 310/1(d).

Petitioner claimed a repetitive trauma injury to her knees as a result of repetitive kneeling and stooping at work. She denied any specific trauma such as falling down, bumping or hitting her knee. The arbitrator and Industrial Commission denied compensability finding that petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that her injury was work-related and not the result of a normal degenerative aging process. Petitioner failed to establish that her squatting and stooping activities rose to the level of repetitive activity sufficient to constitute and accident within the meaning of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. The appellate court reversed the trial courts reversal of the Commission's decision and reinstated the denial of the claim.

Petitioner was injured May 20, 1991. He was off work for 8 2/7 weeks but had continued complaints. He eventually underwent cervical surgery on November 9, 1994. The surgeon testified that there was a causal relationship between the work accident and the surgery while respondents physician rejected such a causal relationship. The arbitrator held that petitioner suffered a neck strain but that the later treatment and surgery were not related to the work injury. In his decision, the arbitrator made specific note of the fact that the claimant elected not to undergo the tests recommended a treating physician, missed eight physical therapy sessions, failed to attend an medical examination scheduled by respondent, and received no medical treatment from September 1991 until August 1992, when he returned to his doctor at the suggestion of his attorney. The Commission affirmed and the appellate court set aside the reversal by the trial court and reinstated the Com mission's original decision.

Tommy Norris was killed in a traffic accident while in the course of his employment with Jones Truck Lines. The driver of the other vehicle was uninsured. His beneficiaries received $200,000 under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. His beneficiaries filed a claim under the employer's National Union which provided uninsured motorist coverage which was deemed byt the court to provide limits of $2,000,000. National Union moved to dismiss the claim as barred under the exclusivity provisions of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. The court held that since the other party to the accident is a stranger to the employment relationship between the decedent and Jones Truck Lines, the plaintiffs have a right to be made whole. The Act does not act as a compete bar to all actions simply because one of the parties and an insurance policy held by an employer are implicated.

Petitioner was injured on a riverboat casino located on the Fox River in Aurora. He filed a Jones Act claim against the casino which the trial court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal. It noted that the general purpose of the Jones Act is to provide heightened legal protection to seamen injured in the course of employment because seaman are exposed to the "peril of the sea." To qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act, a maritime employee must have a substantial employment related connection to a vessel "in navigation." Since at the time of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant had no intention to resume cruising and the defendant's casinos had been permanently withdrawn from navigation for almost two months, the claim did not warrant protection under the Jones Act. Thus, the case would be adjudicated under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.

This case presents a complicated procedural history as follows:

The appellate court held that the circuit courts order of 3-18-98 was not final and appealable until 7-25-01 because the order remanded the case to the Commission and the order allowed the Commission to find that the claimant was entitled to additional TTD for time not yet considered.

Next, the appellate court reversed the circuit courts order of 03-18-98 with respect to the remand for additional consideration on TTD. It vacated the Commission's order of 07-13-99 and the circuit courts orders of 07-13-99 and 07-25-01. Finally, the appellate court reversed the Commission's denial of medical expenses as against the manifest weight of the evidence. It held that the Commission's denial of medical care rendered by a neurologist was improper because the claimant was referred to the neurologist by the emergency room doctor. It also held that the denial of chiropractic expenses was improper because the chiropractic care was not duplicative of physical therapy treatment.

Wal-Mart sought to take advantage of Section 8(a) of the Act which provides that the employee may elect to secure his own physician at the employer's expense or that:

[u]pon agreement between the employer and the employees, or the employees' exclusive representative, and subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission, the employer shall maintain a list of physicians, to be known as a Panel of Physicians, who are accessible to the employees. (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 1998).

On February 16, 2000, the Commission issued an order denying Wal-Mart's petition for approval of a Panel of Physicians. On March 10, 2000, Wal-Mart filed a petition for rehearing and for leave to submit additional evidence in support of its petition for approval of the panel. On March 15, 2000, the Commission issued an order denying and dismissing Wal-Mart's petition for rehearing. In that order, the Commission stated that there is no provision in the Act, its rules, or case law permitting rehearings. On April 7, 2000, Wal-Mart sought judicial review of the Commission's denial. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss Wal-Mart's judicial review action pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 1998)), arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because it was not commenced within the time constraints of section 19(f), i.e., within 20 days of the issuance of the Commission's February 16, 2000, order.

The appellate court rejected Wal-Mart's contention that section 19(f) only applied to review hearings arising out of claims for benefits. It held the 19(f) applied to all hearings before the Commission. Thus, because Wal-Mart failed to initiate its action for judicial review within the 20-day time limit set forth therein, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the action.

The Fourth District Appellate Court held that payment of medical expenses under the Act qualifies as "compensation" under section 6(d) of the Act which provides:

In any case, other than one where the injury was caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment or asbestos unless the application for compensation is filed with the Commission within 3 years after the date of the accident, where no compensation has been paid, or within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation, where any has been paid, whichever shall be later, the right to file such application shall be barred. 820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 1998).

Thus, petitioner's application for adjustment of claim arising out of an accident on July 2, 1989 was not barred by the statute of limitations even though it was not filed until February 3, 1997. The court reviewed the case de novo since it involved a case of statutory construction. It relied on Wherry v. Industrial Comm'n, 233 Ill. App. 3d 192, 194-96, 599 N.E.2d 8, 9-11 (1992) and held that Kaskaskia Constructors v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 Ill. 2d 532, 534, 337 N.E.2d 713, 714 (1975) is no longer viable.

The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the calculation of the average weekly wage under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act for the first time since Hasler v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ill. 2d 46 (1983). The court affirmed the appellate court's decision reversing the Industrial Commission. The case raised eyebrows last year when the appellate court flip-flopped on its own decision. First the appellate court sided with the respondent and issued a decision favorable to employers. Without any further argument, it reversed its own decision and sided with the employee and issued a decision favorable to injured workers. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in a decision that favors employees. Amici curiae briefs were filed by the Illinois Manufacturers Association, National Roofing Contractors Association, Onesource Building Services, Inc., Yellow Freight System, Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, and Custard Claims Management Services, Inc.

Ronald Sylvester was a roofer foreman that earned $21 per hour. When he worked a full week it was eight hours per day for five days. In the winter, he worked approximately five hours per week and also collected unemployment. The court identified four different methods to calculate the average weekly wage under section 10 of the Act. 1) Actual earnings divided by 52; 2) If the employee lost five or more calendar days during the year prior to the accident, the actual earnings are divided by "the number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee actually earned wages"; 3) If the employee's employment began during the 52-week period, the earnings during that period are divided by "the number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee actually earned wages"; 4) Finally, if the employment has been of such short duration that it is "impractical" to use one of the three above methods, then the wages of a comparable employee in the same grade of employment shall be used.

The supreme court applied the second method to the facts of this case. Interestingly, the Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, meaning it did not defer to the Industrial Commission's findings of fact as it normally does. It stated that a de novo review was appropriate because the issue was solely a matter of statutory construction.

The Supreme Court adopted the holdings of D.J. Masonry v. Industrial Comm’n, 295 Ill. App. 3d 924 (1st Dist. 1998), and Peoria Roofing and Sheet Metal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 181 Ill. App. 3d 616 (1989) and rejected Cook v. Industrial Comm’n, 231 Ill. App. 3d 729 (3d Dist. 1992), and Ricketts v. Industrial Comm’n, 251 Ill. App. 3d 809 (4th Dist. 1993). It held that neither Cook nor Rickettes involved a question of statutory construction. It found that both cases had been decided on the insufficiency of evidence introduced by the claimant in each case.

The court acknowledged a 32% windfall to petitioner. The petitioner would receive 32% more in TTD than he would have received in regular earnings.

The wage calculation in Sylvester was to be made as follows: Petitioner's wages during the previous 52 weeks, as determined by the arbitrator, were $17,684.41. Dividing this number by 26.2 results in an average weekly wage of $674.98. But TTD payments are only 66 2/3% of average weekly wage. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(2). 66 2/3% of $674.98 is approximately $450 per week, or $23,400 per year. This is approximately 32% greater than $17,684.41. ($23,400-$17,684 = $5,716; $5,716/$17,684.41 = 0.32, or 32%.)

On appeal, Elmhurst contended that the portion of the Commission's decision ordering it to pay $40,419.36 in medical expenses was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the claimant reached a state of maximum medical improvement prior to the date the medical expenses were incurred. The arbitrator had awarded only $2,293.50 in medical expenses, denying all medical expenses incurred after claimant had reached a state of maximum medical medical improvement. The Industrial Commission reversed the arbitrator and awarded an additional $38,125.86 in medical expenses.

The appellate court affirmed the Industrial Commission and held that the Commission's reliance on Dr. Lamer's testimony was a sufficient basis for its decision. The court noted that for a finding of fact to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly apparent. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 228 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291, 591 N.E.2d 894 (1992). The Commission's determination on a question of fact is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when no rational trier of fact could have agreed. Dolce v. Industrial Comm'n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 117, 120, 675 N.E.2d 175 (1996). The appropriate test is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission's determination. Benson v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ill. 2d 445, 450, 440 N.E.2d 90 (1982).

Petitioner sought benefits for a depressive order which he claimed arose from threats made by his supervisor while he was employed as a police officer at the East St. Louis Police Department. The arbitrator found the case compensable and awarded TTD. The Industrial Commission reversed and found that petitioner's claim was not credible and was wholly uncooberated in the records of his treating physicians which contained no references to the alleged threats.

The appellate court noted that recovery for nontraumatically induced mental disease is limited to those who can establish that: (1) the mental disorder arose in a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees must experience; (2) the conditions exist in reality, from an objective standpoint; and (3) the employment conditions, when compared with the nonemployment conditions, were the 'major contributory cause' of the mental disorder.

While a recovery under the Act can be based upon an injured employee's uncorroborated testimony (Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 485 (1990)), such testimony will not always support an award. Further, it rejected the argument that an extra degree of scrutiny must be applied to a decision of the Commission which reverses the decision of an arbitrator. Wagner Castings Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Ill. App. 3d 584 (1993).

The court held that the Commission's finding that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Department and its denial of his claim for benefits under the Act were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Petitioner and a coworker used a fire hose for 20 to 30 minutes at work to put out a fire. After decedent had returned home from work, decedent looked pale and his breathing was labored. Decedent kept gasping for air and taking short breaths. Decedent's wife called their family physician and got a prescription to help decedent. The medicine did not work and decedent's condition continued to deteriorate. Decedent went to the hospital that night with complaints of abdominal discomfort, chest pain and back pain. He was diagnosed with gastritis and diabetes and was given another prescription and discharged. A chest x-ray taken at the hospital revealed a mild chronic bronchitic change. Sodium, potassium chloride and carbon dioxide levels all were within normal ranges. Decedent called in sick to work the next day. In the early morning hours of July 18th, decedent's wife took decedent back to the hospital. Decedent was diagnosed at that time with bronchitis and pneumonia. One of the consulting physicians noted in his report that decedent was in significant respiratory distress. Later that day decedent suffered a massive heart attack and died. Decedent was 44 years old at the time of his death. The death certificate listed decedent's cause of death as cardiac arrest as a result of cardiogenic shock. No autopsy was performed.

The arbitrator and Industrial Commission held that petitioner's death was causally related to the smoke exposure at work. Decedent's expert and Employer's expert, as expected, supported the parties who had hired them for their opinions. The appellate court held that the decision of the Commission was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It noted that it is the province of the Commission to decide questions of fact and causation, to judge the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicting medical evidence. Steve Foley Cadillac v. Industrial Comm'n, 283 Ill. App. 3d 607, 610, 670 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1996). Merely because different inferences could be drawn from the evidence does not justify a reviewing court overturning the decision of the Commission. Berry v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Ill. 2d 401, 407, 459 N.E.2d 963, 966 (1984). Only if the findings of the Commission are against the manifest weight of the evidence will the decision be reversed, and, in order for a finding to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly apparent. Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 181, 189, 447 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1983).

Claimant sought benefits for injuries he received while assisting fire fighters from the Clover Township Fire Protection District (District) in putting out a farm field fire. Claimant was one of the District's volunteer firemen from March 1993 through March 8, 1994. On March 8, 1994, he was terminated from that position for non-attendance at meetings.

There was a farm field fire in rural Clover Township. The claimant and his father saw the fire and reported it to the District. After reporting the fire, the claimant and his father went to the site of the fire and waited for the District's firemen to arrive. When the firemen arrived, the claimant directed them to a gate where they could get into the field to fight the fire. The claimant admitted that, after he directed the firemen to the gate, no one asked him to remain at the scene. Nevertheless, the claimant began stomping the fire in the area of the gate. Claimant offered to get his farm tractor and disk and assist in putting out the fire by disking the field. The District's assistant fire chief asked to have the claimant go around the fire with his tractor and disk. While the claimant was disking the field, he drove his tractor into a deep washout. His left foot was pinned between the clutch and the floorboard, resulting in a chronic Lisfranc injury. Nevertheless, the claimant continued to assist in extinguishing the fire.

The claimant admitted that he was not paid for his services and had no expectation of being paid.

The court noted that there can be no employer/employee relationship and, therefore, no liability under the Act absent a contract for hire, either express or implied. Goodrick v. Industrial Comm'n, 237 Ill. App. 3d 885, 888, 605 N.E.2d 120 (1992). The court held that since the claimant neither received nor expected payment for his services in assisting the District's firemen, was a purely gratuitous worker and not an employee. It avoided the question of whether Illinois will embrace the emergency doctrine and apply the theory of a quasi-contract of employment to bring an individual under the protection of the Act when he is injured while risking his life in order to protect the lives and health of others since the life-threatening urgency which characterizes the emergency doctrine cases was absent from the facts of this case.

Stewardess Stress Case Compensable
Appellate Court Requires Penalties for Denial by Respondent

Petitioner was a stewardess on American Airlines when an unruly passenger tried to ignite an oxygen canister with a lighter and sprayed the airplane with a chemical that permeated petitioner's working area. Petitioner and six other flight attendants were taken to a local hospital for nausea and dizziness. She and the others were treated and released. When the flight landed in Chicago, claimant immediately was debriefed by the FBI and employer. Employer apologized for the trouble on the flight and gave her a pamphlet entitled "Understanding Traumatic Stress Responses: A Handout for Victims and/or Family Members." Claimant requested to see a counselor and was sent to Dr. George O'Shea. Claimant met with Dr. O'Shea three times and was told she should continue counseling, however, employer refused to pay for any more sessions. Claimant's psychologist diagnosed her with post traumatic stress disorder. Employer's psychologist disagreed with the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder and concluded claimant's problems stemmed more from her anger at employer.

The Commission found the case compensable but reversed the arbitrator's award of penalties. The appellate court noted that In Illinois, psychological injuries are compensable under one of two theories, either physical-mental, when the injuries are related to and caused by a physical trauma or injury, or mental-mental, when the injuries are caused by sudden severe emotional shock traceable to a definite time and place and cause even though no physical trauma or injury was sustained. See City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. App. 3d 734, 738, 685 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1997). Recovery for non-traumatically-induced mental disability is limited to those employees who can establish that: (1) the mental disorder arose in a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees must experience; (2) the conditions exist in reality, from an objective standpoint; and (3) the employment conditions, when compared with the nonemployment conditions, were the major contributing cause of mental disorder. On the other hand, in dealing with the physical-mental category, even a minor physical contact or injury may be sufficient to trigger compensability. See Chicago Park District v. Industrial Comm'n, 263 Ill. App. 3d 835, 842, 635 N.E.2d 770, 776 (1994). In this case, the Commission concluded claimant could recover under either theory and the appellate court agreed.

Surprisingly, the appellate court disagreed with the Commission on the issue of penalties. It noted that the employer was fully aware of the events that transpired on the flight and acknowledged the traumatic nature of the events when it gave claimant the handout and agreed to send her to a counselor. That counselor, Dr. O'Shea, concluded claimant was still in need of treatment after three sessions, but employer refused to pay for further therapy. Thus, the appellate court reversed the Commission on the denial of penalties and reinstated the arbitrator's award of penalties.

Claimant fell and broke his leg while on a day-long sightseeing excursion on the island of Maui, Hawaii. At that time, he was traversing lava rocks. He and two other employees of respondent, including respondent’s president, were in Hawaii on business to install an industrial freezer. The Commission found the case compensable, finding it was reasonable and foreseeable to anticipate that claimant would engage in some type of recreational activity and that the type of activity claimant was engaged in when injured was a reasonable and foreseeable recreational activity. The appellate court agreed.

With respect to the wage issue, respondent argued in favor of the wage calculations made by the arbitrator in which total earnings were divided by the 51 weeks in which claimant worked. Petitioner claimed that the Commission calculated the wage properly by dividing total earnings by the total days worked and multiplying that number by five. The court cited Sylvester, stated that the Commission correctly followed the second statutory method and affirmed the Commission’s calculations.